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COHABITATION IN ILLINOIS: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE
INTERVENTION
STEFANIE L. FERRARI*
INTRODUCTION
Nearly forty years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt 1
ruled against a woman who sought property from her partner of fifteen
years with whom she shared three children, but whom she never married.
In doing so, the court determined that it would not recognize equitable or
contractual rights based on marriage-type relationships between unmarried
cohabitants. 2 Recently, in Blumenthal v. Brewer, 3 the Illinois Supreme
Court had the opportunity to once again weigh in on the issue. However,
despite the Court’s acknowledgement that societal norms and values towards unmarried couples living together have changed significantly in the
past forty years, it nevertheless upheld Hewitt and denied a woman’s equitable claims from her partner of twenty-five years with whom she shared
three children, but could not marry. 4
The Hewitt case was an outlier to begin with—it came in a decade
when cohabitation had catapulted into the limelight 5 and most states began
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018; B.S., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2014.
Thank you to Professor Katharine Baker and Kyle Jacobs, as well as the entire Chicago-Kent Law
Review, for your assistance throughout the various stages of this Note. I would also like to thank all of
the family and friends who loved and supported me in spite of the reclusion this process required; this
Note, and my success during law school, would not have been possible without you all.
1. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
2. Id. (holding that Mrs. Hewitt could not recover an equal share of profits and properties accumulated by her and her partner of fifteen years because such a claim contravened public policy disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants).
3. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 81, 69 N.E.3d 834, 858.
4. Id. (barring plaintiff’s claim for restitution as it contravenes the public policy implicit in the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act). Notably, a significant aspect of this case was that it involved a
same-sex couple who did not have the option to marry in Illinois. A discussion of equal protection and
due process claims can be found in the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the American Civil Liberties
Union of Illinois and Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. However, given the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges legalizing same-sex marriage, issues of constitutional
rights of same-sex couples regarding marriage rights will not be addressed in this Note. 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
5. Around 1970, statutory restraints on cohabitation—such as false registration laws, which
prevented unmarried couples from checking into a hotel—and customary restraints—such as landlords
refusing to rent to unmarried couples—were removed, and by 1998, the number of unmarried cohabit561
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to recognize at least some property-sharing rights between cohabiting couples. Today, Illinois remains one of only three states that refuses to recognize any contractual rights of cohabiting couples regarding property and
support unless those contractual rights are entirely collateral to the relationship. 6 Now that Hewitt has been reaffirmed, the court’s decision, along
with Illinois’s policy on cohabitating couples, has come under much criticism in the popular press. 7 Upon examination, it is clear that the Illinois
Supreme Court is being motivated by a policy goal that is not actually being served.
Part I will serve as an overview of the basis for the Illinois policy on
unmarried cohabitants, as stated in Hewitt. Part I will then look at postHewitt cases to see how Illinois courts have interpreted Hewitt’s holding
and reveal how courts actually treat contractual rights between unmarried
cohabitants in Illinois. Finally, Part I will examine the holding in Blumenthal v. Brewer, 8 to show how it has also failed to accomplish Hewitt’s underlying policy goal. Moreover, Blumenthal’s holding has perpetuated the
unjust results from Hewitt by unfairly withholding protections from nonmarital couples while not actually serving the purported public policy purpose of favoring marriage. This Note argues that, given the Illinois

ing couples increased eightfold, from 523,000 in 1970 to 4.2 million in 1998. THEODORE CAPLOW ET
AL., THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000, at
72 (2001); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Broken Clock: The Illinois Supreme Court Affirms Misguided, 37-Year-Old Ban on Economic Rights for Cohabiting Couples, JUSTIA (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/08/30/broken-clock-illinois-supreme-court-affirms-misguided-37-yearold-ban-economic-rights-cohabiting-couples [https://perma.cc/4PNC-QRW6 ] (“Once a rare and secreted practice, couples began to ‘shack up’ in large number in the 1970s due to changing sexual mores and
the advancement of women’s rights. This was a stark change from the past in which cohabitation was
not only the subject of social disapproval, but was also a criminal act in many states.”).
6. Georgia and Louisiana are the other two states that will not enforce contracts between unmarried cohabitants. See Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to enforce
express and implied contracts between unmarried cohabitants because the agreements rest on immoral
and illegal consideration); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that, “[u]nder present Louisiana law, unmarried cohabitation does not give rise to property
rights analogous to or similar to those of married couples”).
7. See Grossman, supra note 5; Robert McCoppin, Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Property
TRIB.
(Aug.
20,
2016,
1:06
AM),
Division
for
Unmarried
Couples,
CHI.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-illinois-supreme-court-domestic-partnersproperty-ruling-met-20160819-story.html [https://perma.cc/6C6Y-TE64]; Tom Joaquin, Still Locked
Out: In Blumenthal v. Brewer, Illinois Supreme Court Refuses Property Division for an Unmarried
Couple, WOODHULL FREEDOM FOUND. (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.woodhullfoundation.org/2016/sexand-the-law/still-locked-out-in-blumenthal-v-brewer-illinois-supreme-court-refuses-property-divisionfor-an-unmarried-couple/ [https://perma.cc/3XZA-R5UA]; Jim Dey, State High Court Upholds 1979
Ruling in Uncommon Case, NEWS-GAZETTE (Aug. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM) http://www.newsgazette.com/news/local/2016-08-23/jim-dey-state-high-court-upholds-1979-ruling-uncommoncase.html [https://perma.cc/7KSP-GKEX].
8. 2016 IL 118781, 69 N.E.3d 834.
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Supreme Court’s refusal to judicially construct a policy on the economic
rights of cohabitants, the Illinois legislature should step in.
Part II reviews how other states treat marriage-type contractual rights
between unmarried cohabitants and, in doing so, reveals the options available for the Illinois legislature. As will be shown, there is a spectrum of
contractual rights granted to unmarried cohabiting couples ranging from
virtually none to granting unmarried cohabitants many of the same rights
granted to married couples. Each approach offers different benefits and
pitfalls for both cohabitants and courts.
In Part III, I suggest that the Illinois legislature should adopt a statutory scheme allowing unmarried cohabitants to enter into enforceable express
agreements regarding their property and financial rights, even where such
agreements are entered in contemplation of cohabitation. Additionally, I
argue that the legislature should create statutory guidelines detailing when,
and under what circumstances, unmarried cohabitants can bring claims
seeking property or financial rights under the theory of implied contract.
Such a statutory scheme will accomplish the underlying policy goal in
Hewitt—limiting cases between unmarried cohabitants—and put an end to
the current unjust practice in Illinois in which unmarried cohabitants are
denied any legal protections.
I. ILLINOIS LAW ON COHABITATION AGREEMENTS
A. Hewitt v. Hewitt
In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court first spoke on the ability of two
unmarried, cohabiting partners to establish contractual or equitable rights in
the case of Hewitt v. Hewitt. After the plaintiff, Victoria Hewitt, became
pregnant while the couple was attending college together, the defendant,
Robert Hewitt, promised her that he would “share his life, his future, his
earnings and his property” with her. 9 From then on, the couple’s relationship looked very much like a marriage. 10 They lived together for fifteen
years, conceived and raised three children, purchased property together and
established a dental practice. 11 Victoria gave Robert “every assistance a

9. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979).
10. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
1979), and overruled by Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979) (finding that the couple lived “a
most conventional, respectable and ordinary family life”).
11. Robert was a successful dentist who had relied on Victoria’s support, including money she
borrowed from her parents, while he went to school and set up his dental practice. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at
1205.
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wife and mother could give, including social activities designed to enhance
his social and professional reputation.” 12
When the couple broke up, 13 Victoria sought “an equal share of the
profits and properties accumulated by the parties” 14 under theories of implied contract, constructive trust and unjust enrichment. 15 The circuit court
dismissed her complaint finding “that Illinois law and public policy require
such claims to be based on a valid marriage.” 16 The appellate court, adopting the California Supreme Court’s decision in Marvin v. Marvin, 17 reversed the circuit court’s decision and found that plaintiff had a cause of
action based on an express oral contract. 18
On appeal, the supreme court unanimously reversed the appellate
court’s holding. 19 In doing so, the court expressly rejected Marvin and relied heavily on the public policy judgments expressed by the legislature in
enacting the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. However,
upon examination, it becomes clear that the Court’s reasoning is flawed.
1. The Court’s Rejection of Marvin: Faulty Reasoning
One of the main reasons the Illinois Supreme Court refused to recognize contractual or equitable rights arising from cohabitation was its rejection of the reasoning in Marvin. Specifically, the Illinois Supreme Court
read Marvin as stating that, if the courts were to recognize that common
law principles of express contract govern express agreements between unmarried cohabitants, then they must also recognize common law principles
of implied contract, equitable relief and constructive trust in the absence of
such an agreement. 20
According to the Hewitt court, it would be unlikely that couples who
lived together would enter into express agreements regulating their proper12. Id.
13. Victoria, thinking they were married, initially filed for divorce, which the circuit court dismissed since the parties had never been married. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1206.
17. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (allowing for the enforcement of express contracts, so long as it was
not explicitly founded on the consideration of sexual services, as well as implied contracts and equitable
remedies, when warranted by the facts of the case); see also Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1206 (finding that
the appellate court “adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in the widely publicized
case of Marvin v. Marvin”).
18. The appellate court noted that the “single flaw” in the Hewitt’s relationship was the lack of a
valid marriage, thus, Victoria should not be denied relief based on public policy grounds. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d at 1206.
19. Id. at 1211.
20. Id. at 1207.
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ty rights. 21 That being the case, many of the cases brought would rely on
implied contracts or equitable principles which would, in turn, “result in
substantial amounts of litigation . . . [and] necessarily involve details of the
parties’ living arrangements.” 22 Thus, in an attempt to avoid this resulting
extensive litigation, the court concluded that it could not recognize express
agreements. In sum, the court’s argument looks something like this: If we
allow A (express contracts between unmarried cohabitants), then we must
allow B (implied contracts and equitable relief between unmarried cohabitants); we do not want B, as it would result in large amounts of exhaustive
litigation, so we cannot allow A.
This argument rests on a faulty premise (if A, then B). The Hewitt
court indicated that this premise was established in Marvin, but that is an
exaggeration. The court in Marvin merely held that “in the absence of an
express agreement, the court may look to a variety of other remedies in
order to protect the parties’ lawful expectations.” 23 Marvin did not say that
when there was no express agreement the court must recognize another
remedy. Furthermore, the Hewitt court failed to explain why, if Illinois
were to allow express contracts between unmarried cohabitants, it would
also be forced to recognize implied contracts and equitable relief. After all,
even if that is what Marvin held, courts in Illinois would be in no way
bound by that holding. Finally, this premise is clearly not followed in other
areas of law where courts require that a contract be in writing, 24 so why
must it be followed in this area? The Hewitt court offered no explanation as
to why the recognition of express agreements between unmarried cohabitants would automatically lead to the need for recognition of implied
agreements and equitable rights.
The Hewitt court could have determined that only express agreements
would be recognized, thereby avoiding the unwanted litigation it feared
would result from implied and equitable claims while also giving unmarried cohabitants greater certainty regarding their property and financial
situations. Indeed, as discussed in Part II.C infra, many states, post-Marvin,
opted to only enforce express agreements between unmarried cohabitants.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added).
See Illinois Frauds Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/1–80/18 (West 2017).
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2. Public Policy and the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act: False Incentives
The Hewitt court ultimately concluded that contracts between unmarried cohabitants were unenforceable because they contravene public policy
the court thought implicit in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (“IMDMA”). 25 The court found that the IMDMA’s purpose was
clearly to “strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard
family relationships.” 26 The court was reluctant to allow judicial recognition of property rights between unmarried cohabitants for fear that it would
“potentially enhanc[e] the attractiveness of a private arrangement over
marriage.” 27 Therefore, in an effort to protect marriage and reduce any
incentive for couples to live together without marrying, the court concluded
that allowing Victoria to claim contractual rights based on an express oral
agreement would contravene the IMDMA and her claims were thus unenforceable. 28 As a consequence of deciding not to marry, Victoria was understandably denied relief under the IMDMA. However, in the name of
protecting marriage, she was also denied any equitable or contractual rights
arising out of her relationship with Robert. Thus she was left with fewer
rights than single people, who can easily enter into enforceable propertysharing arrangements with others, including roommates or family members.
The Hewitt court conceivably relied so heavily on legislative policy in
a further attempt to avoid litigating claims involving contractual rights
between unmarried cohabitants. Rather than simply granting to unmarried
cohabitants the same right to enter into an enforceable agreement regarding
property and financial rights as those not in a sexual relationship, the court
flatly rejected any equitable or contractual rights and left it to the legislature to update Illinois public policy. In its view, “[t]here are major public
policy questions involved in determining whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to accord some type of legal status to
claims arising from such relationships,” and the legislature is better suited
to make such determinations. 29 Therefore, the Hewitt court held that Illinois
courts would not recognize any equitable or contractual rights between
unmarried cohabitants, other than those about completely independent mat25. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
26. Id. at 1209 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, para. 102 (current version at 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/102)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1211.
29. Id. at 1207.
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ters, for which sexual relations do not form part of the consideration and do
not closely resemble those arising from conventional marriages. 30
B. Post-Hewitt: Is the Illinois Supreme Court’s Policy Goal Being
Served?
The Hewitt court’s strict ban on all types of contractual and equitable
rights has left unmarried cohabitants with very few legal options. While the
Hewitt court recognized “that cohabitation by the parties may not prevent
them from forming valid contracts about independent matters, for which it
is said the sexual relations do not form part of the consideration,” 31 it denied that contracts between cohabitants could be severable from that sexual
relationship. 32 In other words, the only contracts that can be enforced are
those between cohabitants who are not having sex with each other. 33 Therefore, in an attempt to get around this strict ban on any contract in which sex
forms part of the consideration, unmarried cohabitants seeking property or
financial rights have had to resort to trying to prove that they entered into
an agreement entirely independent of their romantic relationship. As can be
seen in Illinois’s case law, these claims generally manifest themselves as
equitable claims.
1. Claims Held Independent from Cohabitation
Two Illinois appellate court cases demonstrate instances where the
court held that contractual rights between unmarried cohabitants were sufficiently separate from the cohabiting relationship so as to render the enforcement of those rights appropriate: Spafford v. Coats 34 and Kaiser v.
Fleming. 35
The plaintiff in Spafford, Donna Spafford, sought a constructive trust
on several vehicles that the parties purchased during their cohabitation,
several of which were financed by a loan which Donna obtained, and others
30. Id. at 1208.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1209.
33. The court noted that several sister states had recognized that housekeeping and homemaking
services could constitute the consideration for an enforceable contract between cohabitants, severable
from the illegal contract founded on sexual relations, or that agreements in which the consideration was
cohabitation may still be valid. Id. at 1208. However, the court rejected this notion and found it would
be “more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of common law marriage than to continue
displaying the naivete . . . involved in the assertion that there are contracts separate and independent
from the sexual activity, and the assumption that those contracts would have been entered into or would
continue without that activity.” Id. at 1209.
34. 455 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
35. 735 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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to which she contributed a substantial portion of the purchase price. 36 In
addressing the trial court’s denial of equitable relief based on public policy
as stated in Hewitt, the Spafford court examined the basis underlying that
decision:
[T]he real and underlying concern of the supreme court in Hewitt was
that judicial recognition of mutual property rights between knowingly
unmarried cohabitants—where the claim is based upon or intimately related to the cohabitation of the parties—would in effect grant to unmarried cohabitants substantially the same marital rights enjoyed by married
persons, resurrect the doctrine of common law marriage, and contravene
the public policy enunciated by the Illinois legislature to strengthen and
preserve the integrity of marriage. 37

The court went on to distinguish the situation before it from the situation in
Hewitt and stated that Donna Spafford’s claims were based on evidence
that she substantially contributed to the consideration for the purchase of
several vehicles, whereas Victoria Hewitt had based her claims primarily
upon the rendition of housekeeping and homemaking services. 38 Thus, the
court concluded that “where the claims do not arise from the relationship
between the parties and are not rights closely resembling those arising from
conventional marriages . . . the public policy expressed in Hewitt does not
bar judicial recognition of such claims.” 39
Similarly, in Kaiser the court found that the plaintiff Barbara Kaiser’s,
claim in equity was “substantially independent” from her relationship with
defendant and allowed her to recover money she had contributed toward
her former cohabiting boyfriend’s mortgage. 40 The parties had been living
together in an unmarried relationship when the defendant suggested to Barbara, who had previously received a lump sum payment from the dissolution of her prior marriage, that she use that money to help him pay off his
mortgage. 41 Barbara subsequently gave the defendant a check for
$47,188.38, the amount remaining on his mortgage, which he used to pay
off the mortgage. 42 While living together, the parties shared expenses, but
Barbara eventually moved out after the relationship became strained. 43

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Spafford, 455 N.E.2d at 242.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
Kaiser, 735 N.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
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Barbara tried to get the money she contributed to the mortgage back,
but defendant refused, telling her that he would repay her the amount when
the property sold and deduct her share of the utility bills that he paid while
she lived in the property. 44 The court distinguished Barbara’s case from a
previous case, Ayala v. Fox, where the court held that the plaintiff did not
have an equity interest in a property she lived in with the defendant even
though she contributed to the mortgage, taxes, and insurance payments. 45
In distinguishing Ayala, the Kaiser court concluded that unlike the plaintiff
there, “plaintiff here alleged rights substantially independent from her
nonmarital relationship with the defendant. . . . Further, the plaintiff in
Ayala sought additional relief akin to a marital relationship and based her
claims on the fact that she and the defendant ‘lived together as husband and
wife.’” 46
Both of these cases involved plaintiffs asserting equitable rights. As
their decisions indicate, Illinois courts are hesitant to grant equitable rights
to unmarried cohabitants, and will do so only where plaintiff has adequate
evidence that the consideration for the agreement arose from something
other than the relationship itself, and where the relief sought does not closely reflect traditional marital rights. More importantly, these cases indicate
how the goal expressed in Hewitt is being undermined under the current
state of Illinois law. The Hewitt court wanted to avoid cases that rely on
equitable principles, but as the above cases exemplify, unmarried cohabitants are bringing cases based on equitable principles. All litigants have to
do is be careful not to allege that they were in a “marriage-type” relationship, or that sex was in any way contemplated as part of the agreement.
Litigants who successfully do so are able to have their equitable claims
heard by the court, which in turn requires the court involving itself in the
details of the parties’ living arrangement. Thus, the very situation Hewitt
sought to avoid—substantial litigation involving details of the parties’ living arrangement—has manifested itself with the help of a little shrewd
lawyering.
2. Claims Held Dependent on Cohabitation
Some Illinois courts have continued to deny relief to unmarried cohabitants who bring claims based on a “marriage-like” or “quasi-marital” relationship. In Costa v. Oliven, 47 Eugene Costa sued Catherine Oliven, with
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Kaiser, 735 N.E.2d at 148 (quoting Ayala, 564 N.E.2d at 921)).
849 N.E.2d 122, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
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whom he had lived with for twenty-four years in an unmarried, “quasimarital” relationship, for imposition of a constructive trust, an accounting,
and payment of unpaid wages and financial compensation. 48 After twelve
years of cohabitation, a child was born to the parties on May 5, 1992, at
which time Costa assumed the role of a stay-at-home dad. 49 According to
his complaint, Oliven “wielded much influence and superior bargaining
power over [plaintiff] . . . and successfully obtained title to almost every
possession the couple acquired through joint labor and efforts.” 50 Nevertheless, the court, relying on Hewitt, denied Costa relief based on constructive
trust and accounting holding that public policy precluded unmarried cohabitants from having an equitable interest in the other’s property. 51
Despite the holdings in Spafford and Kaiser, claimants who do not rely solely on the basis of a marriage-like relationship, but rather on some
economic contribution, may still be denied relief. The Second District in
Ayala v. Fox, 52 extended Hewitt’s limitations from property claims based
on the providing of domestic services to claims based on financial contributions to the acquisition of shared property. 53
Anita Ayala and Lawrence Fox cohabitated together for twelve years,
beginning in 1976. 54 At Fox’s suggestion, they agreed to jointly pay for the
construction of a new home, and Fox promised Ayala that the title to the
property would be transferred to them as joint tenants and that plaintiff
would receive one-half of the equity of the house in the event their relationship terminated. 55 In reliance on the promise, they obtained a $48,000 loan
to pay for the construction of the house. 56 The house was completed in
September 1978, and for ten years the parties cohabitated there and both
contributed to the mortgage payments—however, during the first three
years of cohabitation, Fox was unemployed and Ayala made the majority
of the mortgage, tax and insurance payments. 57 The parties split up in
1988. 58

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 123 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.
564 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Fox did not in fact transfer title to the couple as joint tenants, nor did
he pay Ayala half of the equity in the property. 59 Instead, he put the property in a land trust. 60 Ayala brought suit for a half interest in the realty and
half of the personal property based on theories of promissory estoppel,
unjust enrichment and fiduciary duty. 61 The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that Hewitt barred claims based on property disputes between cohabitants. 62 The appellate court affirmed, and in doing so,
distinguished Spafford.
According to the court, the plaintiff in Spafford “did not seek recovery
based on rights closely resembling those arising from a conventional marriage or on rights founded on proof of cohabitation,” whereas Ayala, whose
claim was “intimately related to her cohabitation with Fox,” was seeking
recovery “based on rights closely resembling those arising from a conventional marriage, namely, an equitable interest in the ‘marital’ residence.” 63
As noted by one commentator, “[t]he court effectively shifted the inquiry
from the basis for the claim (e.g., the nature of the consideration provided)
to the nature of the claimed property,” so that a claimant seeking an interest in a vehicle could do so—since joint ownership of vehicles is not integral to cohabitation—but a claimant seeking an interest in a residence could
not because it “too closely resembles a spouse’s interest in the marital
home.” 64
This case is difficult to reconcile with Kaiser and Spafford, given their
factual similarities. In all three cases, plaintiffs made financial contributions to acquiring property titled in the names of their male cohabitants.
However, in Kaiser and Spafford, cohabitation did not preclude plaintiffs
from recovering their interest in the property, but in Ayala it did. The distinction seems to be in the relief sought, and the grounds plaintiffs based
their claims on. While the plaintiffs in Kaiser and Spafford merely sought
constructive trusts over the amount contributed to shared property, the
plaintiff in Ayala sought fifty percent of the equity in the home and half of
the personal property accumulated during the marriage, which according to
the courts, resembled marital rights too closely. 65 Furthermore, the plain-

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(1994).
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id. at 922.
Jan Skelton, Hewitt to Ayala: A Wrong Turn for Cohabitants’ Rights, 82 ILL. B.J. 364, 368
See Ayala, 564 N.E.2d at 922; Kaiser v. Fleming, 735 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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tiffs in Spafford and Kaiser did not base their claims on the fact they had
“lived together as husband and wife,” as the plaintiff in Ayala did.
Thus, as indicated by Illinois case law, Illinois courts will only enforce
equitable rights where the relief sought does not closely resemble rights
arising out of conventional marriages, and where the claim is not reliant on
the relationship itself as part of the consideration, but rather some form of
financial contribution. For whatever reason—perhaps because couples (or
their lawyers) know that contracts between unmarried couples will not be
enforced in Illinois and thus they do not enter into them, or perhaps because those couples who do enter into contracts assume they will be enforced and thus do not challenge them in court—Illinois appellate courts
have not addressed claims between unmarried cohabitants based on express
contracts. As a result, it remains unclear what exactly a contract between
unmarried cohabitants would have to look like in order to be enforceable.
3. Policy Goal in Hewitt Is Not Being Served
As these cases have shown, Hewitt’s policy goal of avoiding litigation
between unmarried cohabitants is not being served. By banning everything—express contracts, implied contracts and equitable relief—the
Hewitt court has actually allowed for litigation between unmarried cohabitants. Moreover, the reasons given by the Hewitt court for rejecting agreements between unmarried cohabitants 66 have not proven realistic. First, the
court’s attempt at limiting litigation by refusing to recognize express
agreements is clearly not working. Recall that the Hewitt court stated, if
courts were to recognize express contracts, then they would also have to
recognize implied contracts and equitable remedies; and, since most couples would not enter into express agreements, the result would be a flood of
cases based on implied or equitable claims that would necessarily involve
details of the couple’s living arrangement. 67 But as the case law indicates,
the very situation the Hewitt court sought to avoid is happening.
Unmarried cohabitants, being unable to enter into express agreements
with their partners, must bring equitable claims to assert their property
rights which necessarily involve details of the couple’s relationship. Rather
than couples being able to enter into an agreement regulating their property
and financial rights, and thus avoiding the need for courts to determine
such rights, unmarried cohabitants seeking property rights are forced to
seek equitable remedies (but none that are too close to marital rights) which
66. See supra Parts I.A.1 and I.A.2.
67. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979).
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involves the court delving into the couple’s relationship and the circumstances surrounding their agreement to determine whether the consideration
was separate enough from their cohabitation so as to not defy the public
policy expressed in Hewitt. The Hewitt court’s goal of avoiding this litigation would have been better served simply by allowing express agreements,
so that unmarried cohabitants could have greater certainty regarding their
property and financial rights and would know that failing to have such an
agreement would likely defeat any claim.
The Hewitt court’s second basis for rejecting agreements between unmarried cohabitants is equally unrealistic. As discussed in Part I.A.2 above,
the court placed much emphasis on the legislature’s supposed public policy
favoring marriage, feared discouraging marriage by judicially recognizing
property rights between unmarried cohabitants, and refused to recognize
any equitable or contractual rights between unmarried cohabitants. However, there is nothing to indicate that Illinois’s refusal to enforce cohabitation
agreements has incentivized more couples to marry, or disincentivized
couples from living together unmarried. 68 In fact, in recent years, Illinois’s
percentage of unmarried couples living together has continued to increase,
while that of married couples living together has decreased. 69 If anything,
in its attempt to make marriage more desirable, by withholding from unmarried cohabitants the rights associated with marriage, the Hewitt court
created a one-sided incentive. 70 Partners who are more likely to perform
non-economic work within the family, generally women, would have the
incentive that the Hewitt court imagined—marry their partners in order to
gain the protections of equitable distribution and maintenance. However,
the other partner might have the opposite incentive—avoid marriage, but
reap its benefits, in order to secure sole ownership of wages and property

68. Grossman, supra note 5 (“[F]amily law incentives are hard to predict because people seldom
know or understand the legal backdrop against which they form families; and even when they do know,
they act from the heart rather than the head.”).
69. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2011–2015 American Community Survey
5-Year
Estimates,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP02
&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/6R9P-H2MA]; Selected Social Characteristics In the United States:
2006–2010 American Community Survey 5–Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP02
&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/6R9P-H2MA].
70. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Cohabitation and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1424 (2011) (pointing out that denying
remedies because there has been unmarried cohabitation punishes only one of the two cohabitants and
enriches the other). “Such an unequal outcome itself might weaken rather than strengthen the institution
of marriage because it creates an incentive for the more financially savvy partner to opt out of marriage.” Id.

574

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 93:2

accumulated during the relationship. 71 Thus, at best, the Hewitt court’s
attempt to “preserve the integrity of marriage” incentivizes just the noneconomic working partner to marry; at worst, it disproportionately advantages the breadwinner. 72
C. Blumenthal v. Brewer
Given the track record of cases following Hewitt, one would have expected the Illinois Supreme Court to reevaluate its position on cohabitation
agreements when given the chance decades later. But rather than learning
from Hewitt’s shortcomings, and recognizing the vast legal and social
changes that have taken place since, the Illinois Supreme Court simply
reiterated Hewitt’s main, albeit flawed, holding in Blumenthal v. Brewer 73:
Illinois courts will not enforce equitable or contractual (express or implied)
rights between cohabiting couples based on their marriage-like relationship
because Illinois public policy, expressed by the legislature, favors marriage. 74 As in Hewitt, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have been motivated by its desire to avoid litigating these claims and has once again used
the fear of discouraging marriage to justify leaving it up to the legislature.
1. Background
Dr. Jane E. Blumenthal and Judge Eileen M. Brewer maintained a
twenty-six-year domestic partnership and raised three children together, but
never married. 75 Following the birth of their children, Brewer stayed home
as their children’s primary caregiver and spent the greater amount of time
in domestic tasks, which allowed Blumenthal to focus on her medical career and become the family’s primary breadwinner. 76 “As a consequence of
the allocation of their respective responsibilities in the family following the
birth of their children, Blumenthal came to earn two to three times as much
71. The Illinois Appellate Court in Blumenthal also addressed these potential unintended consequences of the Hewitt ruling. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 32, 24 N.E.3d 168,
179, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 2016 IL 118781, 69 N.E.3d 834 (“The ruling, however, may have
the contrary effect—refusing to hear claims between unmarried cohabitants creates an incentive for
some to not marry. A cohabitant who by happenstance or design takes possession or title to jointlyacquired assets is able to retain them without consequence when their ‘financially vulnerable’ counterpart is turned away by the courts.” (quoting Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 70)). It also argued that the
decision of Hewitt may have had the contrary policy effect of actually discouraging marriage because,
by refusing to hear claims between unmarried cohabitants, the courts create an incentive for some to not
marry.
72. See Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
73. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, 69 N.E.3d 834.
74. Id. ¶ 87, 69 N.E.3d at 860.
75. Id. ¶ 2, 69 N.E.3d at 839; Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 1, 24 N.E.3d at 169.
76. Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶¶ 5-6, 24 N.E.3d at 170.
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annually as Brewer.” 77 However, during their entire relationship, the couple
commingled their assets, including savings and investments. 78 Using funds
from their joint account, between 2000 and 2008, Blumenthal purchased an
ownership interest in her medical practice group. 79 Brewer contended that
she allowed Blumenthal to make this investment using their joint account
“with the reasonable understanding and expectation that she, Brewer,
would continue to benefit from the earnings derived from [the medical
group].” 80
Blumenthal and Brewer ended their relationship in 2008, at which
time Brewer ceased benefitting from the earnings of the medical practice as
Blumenthal retained the entire interest in the medical group. 81 After the
relationship ended, Blumenthal sought partition of the family home she
shared and jointly owned with Brewer. 82 Brewer counterclaimed for various common-law remedies, including sole title to the home as well as an
interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in the medical group “so that the
couples overall assets would be equalized.” 83 Brewer claimed that Blumenthal was unjustly enriched and requested that the court create a constructive
trust from Blumenthal’s share of the annual earnings of the group or any
proceeds from the sale of Blumenthal’s interest in the group that was attributable to Brewer’s earnings or inheritance during their relationship. 84
At the trial level, Blumenthal argued that Illinois public policy, as
stated in Hewitt, did not allow for implied contract claims based on nonmarital cohabitation. 85 The circuit court dismissed all counts of Brewer’s

77. Id. ¶ 6, 24 N.E.3d at 170.
78. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 46, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
79. Id.
80. Id. Furthermore, “‘[i]t was [the couple’s] understanding that Brewer would not suffer any
financial disadvantage from the way in which [they] allocated their parenting and career responsibilities’ and ‘it was [always] their practice to share equally the same home, food, automobiles, vacations,
vacation property, and to the extent they could, savings and investments.’” Blumenthal, 2014 IL App
(1st) 132250, ¶ 6, 24 N.E.3d at 171 (alteration in original).
81. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 46, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
82. Id. ¶ 2, 69 N.E.3d at 839.
83. Id. ¶ 3, 69 N.E.3d at 839. Counts I, II, IV, and V of Brewer’s counterclaim all concerned the
partition of the parties’ Chicago home and were dismissed after the circuit court’s judgment setting the
value of the home and allocating the home’s equity between the parties. Id. ¶¶ 21–43, 69 N.E.3d at
842–48. Count III concerned Brewer’s request that the court impose a constructive trust on Blumenthal’s medical group to remedy unjust enrichment or, in the alternative, for restitution. Id. ¶ 45, 69
N.E.3d at 848. Count III was the only appealable claim, and therefore, the only claim considered by the
Illinois Supreme Court under the Hewitt analysis. See id. ¶¶ 45–91, 69 N.E.3d at 848–60.
84. Id. ¶ 46, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
85. Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 15, 24 N.E.3d at 173.
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counterclaim, finding them barred as a matter of law by the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Hewitt. 86
The Illinois Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of Brewer’s counterclaim by the circuit court and remanded for consideration of the parties’
remaining arguments, mainly, whether Brewer’s counterclaims satisfied the
necessary elements of an implied contract. 87 On appeal Brewer argued that
the legislative policies underlying the Hewitt decision either no longer existed or had been substantially modified, and thus the trial court’s reliance
on the Hewitt opinion was misplaced. 88 She contended that at the time
Hewitt was decided, “it was public policy to treat unmarried relationships
as illicit,” but in the decades since Hewitt was decided, the Illinois legislature had made profound legislative changes that, in effect, implicitly overruled Hewitt’s categorical restriction on claims by unmarried partners. 89
Blumenthal responded that Hewitt “was not based on a legislative policy to
stigmatize or penalize cohabitants for their relationship, but was instead
based on a statute that abolished common law marriage.” Furthermore,
Blumenthal argued that Hewitt remains good law “because it gives effect to
Illinois’ ongoing public policy that individuals acting privately by themselves cannot create a marriage relationship and that the government must
be involved in the creation of that bond.” 90
The appellate court found merit in both parties’ arguments, but ultimately agreed with Brewer’s claims, finding that “the public policy to treat
unmarried partnerships as illicit no longer exist[ed], that Brewer’s suit
[was] not an attempt to retroactively create a marriage, and that allowing
her to proceed with her claims . . . [did] not conflict with [Illinois’s] abolishment of common law marriage.” 91 In support of its decision, the appellate court adopted Brewer’s list of post-Hewitt legislative policy changes 92
as evidence that “public policy has shifted dramatically in the ensuing 35
years and that ongoing application of Hewitt is no longer justified.” 93

86. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 10, 69 N.E.3d at 841.
87. Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 40, 24 N.E.3d at 183.
88. Id. ¶ 16, 24 N.E.3d at 173.
89. Id. ¶ 16, 24 N.E.3d at 173–74. The legislative policies Brewer relied upon include the repeal
of the criminal prohibition on nonmarital cohabitation, the prohibition of differential treatment of
marital and nonmarital children, the adoption of no-fault divorce, the establishment of civil unions for
both opposite-sex and same-sex partners, and the extension of other significant protections to nonmarital families. Id. ¶ 16, 24 N.E.3d at 173.
90. Id. ¶ 17, 24 N.E.3d at 174.
91. Id. ¶ 18, 24 N.E.3d at 174.
92. Id. ¶¶ 22–28, 33–35, 24 N.E.3d at 176–77, 180–81; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. Id. ¶ 22, 24 N.E.3d at 176.
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Accordingly, the appellate court found Hewitt’s holding was misplaced. 94 Moreover, rather than an attempt to retroactively redefine the
couple’s relationship to receive the benefits of a legal marriage, as argued
by Blumenthal, the court viewed Brewer’s counterclaim as a claim to have
the same common-law property rights as others who are not in a cohabiting, unmarried relationship. 95 Thus, Brewer’s counterclaim was remanded
to the circuit court.
2. The Illinois Supreme Court Weighs in Again
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Brewer’s invitation to
overrule Hewitt and held that it remained good law. 96 After resolving
counts I, II, IV and V of Brewer’s counterclaim on other grounds, 97 the
court turned to its discussion of Hewitt with respect to count III which
sought a constructive trust on Blumenthal’s medical practice to prevent
unjust enrichment, or in the alternative, restitution. 98 The court found these
equitable remedies inappropriate since, “[w]hen considering the property
rights of unmarried cohabitants, [the court’s] view of Hewitt’s holding
ha[d] not changed.” 99 Thus, such equitable claims could not be recognized.
The court concluded, “[o]ur decision in Hewitt bars such relief if the claim
is not independent from the parties’ living in a marriage-like relationship
for the reason it contravenes the public policy, implicit in the statutory
scheme of the Marriage and Dissolution Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.” 100
The court reiterated the holding in Hewitt without addressing its problems. First, the court stated that “unmarried individuals may make express
or implied contracts with one another, and such contracts will be enforceable if they are not based on a relationship indistinguishable from marriage.” 101 But the court offered little assistance to litigants trying to
determine whether their agreement is adequately independent of their relationship so as to allow equitable or contractual rights. In an apparent at94. Id. ¶¶ 36–38, 24 N.E.3d at 182.
95. Id.
96. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 64, 69 N.E.3d at 853.
97. The Illinois Supreme Court found the appellate court’s judgment with respect to counts I, II,
IV, and V (common-law claims related to the partition of the couple’s home) to be “fatally flawed” for
two reasons unrelated to Hewitt: (1) the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from
dismissal of those counts as it was not a final judgment, and (2) the appellate court had no authority to
overrule the Hewitt decision and remained bound by it. Id. ¶¶ 21–29, 69 N.E.3d at 842–44.
98. Id. ¶ 45, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
99. Id. ¶ 63, 69 N.E.3d at 853.
100. Id. ¶ 73, 69 N.E.3d at 856.
101. Id. ¶ 87, 69 N.E.3d at 860.
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tempt to draw a line between independent and dependent claims, the court
found that, where there is an indication that the unmarried cohabiting couple desired to live in a marriage-type relationship by “commingl[ing] their
personal property and their finances,” or “pool[ing] their assets and finances” to use in making purchases “to better their family situation,” any claim
seeking mutually enforceable property rights would be barred. 102 This
fuzzy line may invite even more litigation by opening the door to unmarried cohabitants who can argue that they did not pool their assets, or did not
buy that car/make that investment/buy that house to better their family
situation.
Second, the court stated that any change in Hewitt’s interpretation of
Illinois public policy regarding unmarried cohabitants must be made by the
legislature. 103 The court underwent a detailed discussion rejecting Brewer’s
arguments that various post-Hewitt legislative enactments indicate a public
policy shift in regard to unmarried couples and their children. 104 Contrary
to Brewer’s assertion that such enactments indicate that the application of
Hewitt is no longer justified, the court viewed these enactments—along
with the fact that the statutory prohibition against common-law marriage
has remained “completely untouched and unqualified” 105—as an indication
that the legislature had acquiesced to Hewitt’s holding. 106 The court concluded that it would “leave it to the legislative branch to determine whether
and under what circumstances a change in the public policy governing the
rights of parties in non-marital relationships is necessary.” 107 Therefore, the
court remained resolute that Illinois public policy favoring marriage is best
served by withholding contractual and equitable rights from non-marital
couples, regardless of what unfair consequences might result.

102. Id. ¶¶ 70–73, 69 N.E.3d at 855–56. For Brewer, this meant her claim to an interest in the
medical group was barred since the court determined that the investment in the medical group was “an
investment for the family . . . intimately related and dependent on Brewer’s marriage-like relationship
with Blumenthal.” Id. ¶ 71, 69 N.E.3d at 855.
103. See id. ¶¶ 74–81, 69 N.E.3d at 856–58.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 76, 69 N.E.3d at 857.
106. Id. ¶ 77, 69 N.E.3d at 857. However, as pointed out by Justice Theis in her dissent, the legislature’s silence on the rights of cohabitants does not necessarily indicate its rejection of claims brought
by unmarried cohabitants asserting contractual or equitable rights. Id. ¶ 112, 69 N.E.3d at 866 (Theis, J.,
dissenting) (“Simply because the legislature has taken some action in the domestic relations arena does
not mean that this court cannot act as well.”).
107. Id. ¶ 80, 69 N.E.3d at 858.

2018]

COHABITATION IN ILLINOIS

579

D. Looks Like a Job for the Legislature
The Blumenthal court’s refusal to overrule Hewitt, coupled with its
failure to draw a concrete line for determining what claims are adequately
independent from the cohabitation to be considered enforceable, has left
Illinois with a problem: the Illinois Supreme Court’s underlying policy
goal—avoid litigating property claims between unmarried cohabitants—is
not being served. Claims between unmarried cohabitants continue to manifest themselves in the only way conceivable—one partner asserts an equitable claim for which the consideration is something other than the
relationship itself and seeks relief that does not look too much like marital
rights. 108 And not only do these claims manifest themselves, but the meritorious ones actually win. 109 Thus, there seems to be some situations where
the courts deem the cohabitant worthy of receiving property rights, but
without a clear indication of what relationships are worthy of recognition,
litigation may continue to increase as cohabitation increases.
If the Illinois Supreme Court is going to continue to refuse to judicially determine the rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants concerning
property and financial rights, then the legislature must take action. By giving courts and litigants something to rely on, the legislature can limit the
quantity and type of claims brought by cohabitants—thus accomplishing
the aim of the supreme court—while also ensuring that those relationships
that are most worthy of recognition are protected.
II. WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS?
Although no state has a statutory scheme specifically addressing the
rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants, forty-seven states enforce
some form of relief based on a cohabitating relationship. 110 The contractual
rights granted to unmarried cohabitants ranges from virtually none—as is
the case in Illinois, Georgia and Louisiana where courts refuse to enforce
any agreement regarding property and support between unmarried cohabitants unless it is entirely collateral to the intimate relationship 111—to rights
very similar to those given to married couples. Washington State, for example, essentially treats cohabitating couples the same as married couples
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. See supra Part I.B.1.
110. Illinois, Georgia, and Louisiana are the only three states that have disapproved of enforcing
all forms of relief based on a cohabiting relationship. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill.
1979); Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441
So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
111. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211; Long, 441 S.E.2d at 476; Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 325.
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upon termination of the relationship. 112 The majority of states will enforce
express or implied contracts between cohabitants, and grant equitable relief.
Thus, the Illinois legislature has a variety of options available to it in
deciding what type of agreements between unmarried cohabitants will be
recognized. This section will examine how other jurisdictions have chosen
to handle allocating property rights after unmarried cohabitants end their
relationships and the benefits and detriments associated with each approach.
A. Marvin v. Marvin: Express Agreements, Implied Agreements, and
Equitable Relief Recognized
As previously discussed, the first court to directly speak on the law’s
role in regulating cohabitational relationships was the California Supreme
Court in Marvin v. Marvin. 113 There, actor Lee Marvin was romantically
involved with Michele Triola, and they lived together for over five years
until they eventually split. 114 Triola sued Marvin for support and one-half
of the property acquired during the course of their relationship based on an
oral agreement they had to “combine their efforts and earnings and [] share
equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether
individual or combined.” 115
The court’s decision came during a time when cohabitation had
moved from the fringes to the center of society. 116 As such, the Marvin
majority relied on the newfound social acceptability of cohabitation and
urged that “the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society
and the social acceptance of them” required courts to decline applying traditional legal standards that were “based on alleged moral considerations
that [had] apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.” 117 In doing
so, the Marvin court not only approved the enforcement of explicit relational contracts between cohabitants, but also authorized trial courts to
112. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (adopting the rule that courts
must examine the meretricious relationship and the property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the property).
113. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
114. Id. at 110.
115. Id.
116. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42
FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008).
117. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122 (“[W]e believe that the prevalence of non-marital relationships in
modern society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no
means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship . . . .”).
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“inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct
demonstrate[d] an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or
joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.” 118
The court also approved of equitable remedies—quantum meruit, constructive trust, resulting trust—which had served as relief to cohabitants prior to
its decision, and left open the possibility of “additional equitable remedies
to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in
cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate.” 119 Thus, California
became the first state to judicially recognize and “dramatically expand the
range of rights and remedies available to cohabiting couples.” 120
After California’s holding in Marvin, many other states followed suit
and held that cohabitants could assert property rights under express contract, implied contract or equity. 121 Despite it being the dominant approach
to cohabitation claims in the United States, this approach to regulating
rights between cohabitants has two substantial pitfalls.
First, it may be very difficult to prove an implied agreement or assert
equitable rights, as exemplified by the aftermath of the California Supreme
Court’s ruling in Marvin. Michele Triola spent three months on remand
attempting to assert her property rights under any of the three options the
Supreme Court expressly approved of. However, the trial court found that
“no express contract was negotiated between the parties” and that “the
conduct of the parties . . . does not reveal any implementation of any contract nor . . . give rise to an implied contract.” 122 The court went on to conclude that there was no “mutual effort” that might support a recovery and
118. Id.
119. Id. at 123 n.25.
120. Garrison, supra note 116, at 315.
121. States that recognize express and implied contracts as well as equitable rights include: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Katherine C.
Gordon, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When Strings Attach and How to
Prevent Them—A State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245, 249 (1999) (“[C]ourts in these states have
demonstrated a willingness to use various theories to grant relief to the aggrieved party upon termination of a period of unmarried cohabitation.”) See also, e.g., Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz.
1986); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142 (Conn.
1987); Poe v. Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Maria v. Freitas, 832 P.2d 259 (Haw.
1992); Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Kerkove v. Thompson, 487 N.W.2d 693
(Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Ellis v. Berry, 867 P.2d 1063 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732
S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Crowe v. DeGioia, 495 A.2d
889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Knauer v.
Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Harmon v. Rogers, 510 A.2d 161 (Vt. 1986); Connel v.
Francisco, 898 P.2d 831(Wash. 1995); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts,
405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987).
122. HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 235 (6th ed.
2007) (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
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that, “in good conscience,” no equitable remedies were applicable. 123 In the
court’s view, Lee Marvin never had any obligation to support Michelle and
therefore had not been unjustly enriched, and that Michelle had in fact benefited from the parties’ cohabitation. 124 Despite these findings, the court
nonetheless awarded the plaintiff $104,000 in alimony,
so that she may have the economic means to reeducate herself and to
learn new, employable skills or to refurbish those utilized, for example,
during her most recent employment and so that she may return from her
status as companion of a motion picture star to a separate, independent
but perhaps more prosaic existence. 125

However, this award was promptly stuck down on appeal as it had not been
sanctioned by the contract approach outlined in Marvin. 126 Thus, Michele
Triola walked away from her landmark victory in the California Supreme
Court with nothing.
Second, this approach gives the cohabitant seeking to assert contractual rights more leverage over the partner with the property. The nonproperty-owning-partner can easily allege an implied contract in Marvin
jurisdictions. The threat of a lengthy court battle then gives this partner
greater leverage in any agreement to equitably divide property when a cohabitating relationship ends. This also gives the property-owning partner a
greater incentive to reach an agreement with their ex-cohabitants outside of
court given the multiple judicial tools available to cohabitants to establish
property rights. Thus, even cohabitants who had no intention of creating
property/finance-sharing rights might be able to put themselves in a position to obtain such rights by threatening a lawsuit.
B. Beal v. Beal: Express or Implied Agreements Recognized
Another approach, taken by Oregon, is to only enforce express and
implied agreements between unmarried cohabitants. 127 As stated by the
123. Id.
124. Cordelia S. Munroe, Comment, Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 389,
420 (1982).
125. Krause, supra note 122; see also Garrison, supra note 116.
126. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
127. Alaska takes a similar approach. See Wood v. Collins, 812 P.2d 951, 955–57 (Alaska 1991)
(implementing the rule that property accumulated during cohabitation should be divided by determining
the express or implied intent of the parties and refusing to extend equitable remedies to unmarried
cohabitants). Maryland, Nebraska and Wyoming will also enforce express and implied agreements
between unmarried cohabitants, but unlike Oregon and Alaska, have not expressly denied equitable
remedies to such couples. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Flisher, 572 A.2d 501, 509 (Md. 1990);
Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Neb. 1981); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo.
1981).
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Oregon Supreme Court in Beal v. Beal, when dividing property accumulated during a non-marital cohabitating relationship, Oregon takes the approach of first inquiring into the intent of the parties. 128 Where intent can
be found, such as in an express written agreement, it should control the
property division; and, even where a written agreement does not exist,
“courts should closely examine the facts in evidence to determine what the
parties implicitly agreed upon.” 129
Unlike the California Supreme Court in Marvin, the Oregon Supreme
Court illustrated various guidelines courts could use to determine the implied intent of the cohabitants:
[I]nferences can be drawn from factual settings in which the parties
lived. Cohabitation itself can be relevant evidence of an agreement to
share incomes during continued cohabitation. Additionally, joint acts of
a financial nature can give rise to an inference that the parties intended to
share equally. Such acts might include a joint checking account, a joint
savings account, or joint purchases. 130

The couple in Beal, one month after obtaining a divorce, purchased a house
where the defendant, Barbara Beal, contributed the majority of the down
payment and made the first monthly payment, and the plaintiff, Raymond
Beal made all subsequent monthly payments. 131 The parties lived together
in the house and had a joint savings account, but maintained separate
checking accounts. Barbara paid some of the costs for home improvements,
and her income was used for family expenses. 132
Applying the aforementioned guidelines, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that the record supported the position that the parties intended to pool
their resources for their common benefit during the time they lived together. 133 This conclusion, the court said, was evidenced by the living arrangement itself, as well as Barbara’s testimony that she contributed her entire
income to the maintenance of the household and that she gave plaintiff
money on one occasion for the monthly house payment. Further, “[n]either
party made any effort to keep separate accounts or to total their respective
contributions for reimbursement purposes, and, although they had separate
checking accounts, they had a joint savings account.” 134 Thus, the court
concluded the parties would be considered equal co-tenants, except that
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 510.
Id.
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Barbara would be entitled to an offset representing the amount she paid
over and above one-half of the down payment. 135
In adopting this intent-based rule, the Beal court attempted to cure
problems with the previous “unannounced but inherent” judicial approach
to assessing property rights of unmarried cohabitants. 136 The old, hands-off
approach—which was simply that the party with title, or, in some instances, possession, would receive ownership rights in the property concerned—
”often operate[d] to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd.” 137
Furthermore the courts, in claiming that they would have no involvement in
such matters, actually established “‘an effective and binding rule of law
which tend[ed] to operate purely by accident or perhaps by reason of the
cunning, anticipatory designs of just one of the parties.’”138 The Beal court
also rejected the “mechanistic application” of co-tenancy rules since they
did not “consider the nature of the relationship of the parties,” and would
“not often accurately reflect the expectations of the parties.” 139
Thus, Beal’s intent-based approach has the benefit of ensuring that
whichever party has title does not obtain imbalanced leverage over the
other. It also gives cohabiting couples the assurance that their intended
agreements, whether expressed in a written agreement or implied in their
actions, will be enforceable by the court. However, similar to Marvin jurisdictions, this approach may grant one partner inappropriate leverage upon
the parties’ separation if he or she can point to any facts which indicate the
couple entered an implied agreement to share property. Unlike Marvin
jurisdictions, the intent-based approach gives courts more specific guidelines regarding what facts they can consider when finding such an intent.
For that reason, the leverage of the parties remains more balanced in an
intent-based jurisdiction since the court is limited to either enforcing express agreements, or enforcing implied agreements but only when certain
facts can be shown regarding the couple’s living and financial arrangements during their relationship.

135.
136.
137.
cially)).
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 509.
Id. (quoting West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (Wash. 1957) (Finley, J., concurring speId.
Id. at 510.
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C. Wilcox v. Trautz: Only Express Agreements Recognized
A final approach taken by states is to enforce only express written
agreements between unmarried cohabitants. Courts in Kentucky 140, Massachusetts 141, Michigan 142, Minnesota 143, Mississippi 144, New Hampshire 145,
New Mexico 146, New York 147, North Dakota 148, Ohio 149 and Texas 150 will
enforce express agreements concerning property and financial rights be-

140. Kentucky courts, along with those in New Mexico and New York, have refused to recognize
implied agreements between unmarried cohabitants as contrary to the abolition of common law marriage, but have not expressly refused recognizing equitable rights. See Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d
149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d 1285 (N.M. 1983); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d
1154 (N.Y. 1980).
141. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Mass. 1998) (stating that unmarried cohabitants may
lawfully contract concerning property, financial and other matters relevant to their relationship, and,
such a contract is subject to rules of contract law and is valid even if expressly made in contemplation
of a common living arrangement, except to the extent that sexual services constitute the only—or
dominant—consideration for the agreement, or that enforcement should be denied on some other public
policy ground).
142. The Michigan Court of Appeals has recognized that contracts entered into during the course
of a “meretricious relationship” may be enforceable where there is “an express agreement to accumulate
or transfer property following a relationship of some permanence and an additional consideration in the
form of either money or of services.” Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973);
see also Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“While the judicial branch is
not without power to fashion remedies in this area, we are unwilling to extend equitable principles to
the extent plaintiff would have us do so, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in law
essentially would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which was specifically abolished by
the Legislature.” (citations omitted)).
143. MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2008) provides that a contract which deals with the property and
financial relationship of an unmarried, cohabiting man and woman will be enforced only if it is written
and if the parties seek to enforce it after the relationship ends. MINN. STAT. § 513.076 provides that a
trial court cannot hear claims by parties where there is no written contract if the consideration for the
oral contract was the intimate relationship of the couple.
144. Mississippi does not authorize ordering division of property between cohabitants when the
claim is “based upon a relationship.” Cates v. Swain, 215 So.3d 492, 495 (Miss. 2013). However, the
Mississippi Supreme Court recently held that a cohabitant could recover the amounts she contributed
toward the purchase and improvement of a joint residence based on a theory of unjust enrichment since
the claim for recovery was based upon something other than the relationship itself. Id.
145. Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1982) (refusing to recognize implied contracts,
or grant remedies under the theory of quantum meruit, between unmarried cohabitants without guidance
from the legislature).
146. See supra note 140.
147. See supra note 140.
148. Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (holding that cohabitants generally may
bring an action for partition of property if their intention was clear to own property jointly, but mere
cohabitation is not enough to support the right to partition in the absence of actual joint ownership).
149. Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio 1994) (refusing to allow property division between
unmarried cohabitants because of the lack of precedent).
150. Section 26.01(b)(3) of Texas’s statute of frauds requires that promises made on consideration
of nonmarital conjugal cohabitation be in writing to be enforceable. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
26.01(b)(3) (West 2017). See also Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App. 1997) (barring
claims arising from a purported oral or implied partnership agreement as violative of the statute of
frauds).
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tween unmarried cohabitants so long as the consideration is not based primarily on sexual services.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts nicely laid out this approach in Wilcox v. Trautz. 151 There, the court expressly recognized, for the
first time, “that unmarried cohabitants may lawfully contract concerning
property, financial, and other matters relevant to their relationship,” and
such contracts are “subject to the rules of contract law and [are] valid even
if expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, except to the extent that sexual services constitute the only, or dominant, consideration for the agreement, or that enforcement should be denied on some
other public policy ground.” 152 In that case, a woman who had cohabited
with a man as an unmarried couple for approximately twenty-five years 153
brought an action seeking declaration that the written property agreement
they had entered was invalid and unenforceable. 154 “The agreement basically establishe[d] that, whether acquired before or during the relationship,
‘what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is yours.’” 155
In holding that the agreement should be enforced, the court recognized
the dramatic changes in social mores regarding cohabitation between unmarried parties; such living arrangements were becoming relatively common and accepted. 156 Because “a considerable number of persons live
together without benefit of the rules of law that govern property, financial,
and other matters in a marital relationship,” the court reasoned that it would
“do well to recognize the benefits to be gained by encouraging unmarried
cohabitants to enter into written agreements, as the consequences for each

151. 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998).
152. Id. at 146. Cases to the contrary in Massachusetts were expressly overruled. Id.
153. The parties lived together in a house purchased by defendant, with title in his name only.
Between 1973 and 1992, the plaintiff contributed $25 a week toward general household expenses, and
throughout the course of the relationship, the plaintiff performed various household duties. She also
contributed some of her income toward the maintenance and improvement of the parties’ home. Id. at
143.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 144 n.1. The court continued:
Specifically the agreement provide[d] that each party’s earnings and property is his or hers
alone, and the other party shall have no interest in the property of the other; any services rendered by either party are voluntary and without expectation of compensation; the parties shall
maintain separate accounts; any debts or obligations are the responsibility of the party who
acquired them; if one party contributes to the mortgage payment of a premises owned by the
other party, the contribution is to be deemed rent only and shall not create in the contributor
any interest in the property; and any money transferred from one party to the other, with the
exception of mortgage or rent payments, shall be deemed a loan.
Id.
156. Id. at 144.
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partner may be considerable on termination of the relationship or, in particular, the death of one of the partners.” 157
The court concluded that it would “ma[ke] no sense” to uphold certain
financial and property arrangements between unmarried cohabitants—such
as agreements to hold real property jointly or in common, agreements to
create joint bank and other accounts, agreements to create joint investments, and testamentary disposition—that stem from a relationship involving sexual cohabitation, but “withhold enforcement of written agreements
between the same parties when they attempt to settle the financial and other
consequences if they should separate.” 158 In either case, the parties are
motivated by “an intention to hold, or dispose of, property in a mutually
acceptable way in order to manage day-to-day matters and to avoid litigation when the relationship ends.” 159
Thus, the court held that the instant property division agreement was
valid and enforceable, as both parties had capacity to contract and understood each other’s financial worth prior to execution of the agreement. 160
However, the court also stressed that its decision left intact prior decisions
affording preference for marriage, and should not “be taken as a suggestion
or intimation that [the court is] retreating from [its] prior expressions regarding the importance of the institution of marriage and the strong public
interest in ensuring that its integrity is not threatened.” 161
This approach grants unmarried cohabitants a great deal of certainty
concerning their financial and property rights. Cohabiting couples can rest
assured that as long as their contract abides by the rules of contract law—
i.e. there was not fraud, overreaching, unconscionability, etc.—the court
will enforce it unless the primary consideration is sexual services. Cohabitants can easily avoid drafting an agreement based solely on sexual services
or fidelity by excluding those topics and, more generally, the mention of
domestic services, and instead framing the consideration in terms of “the
common welfare of both parties, combined with an effort to further their
financial partnership.” 162
The problem with this approach is that, if the couple draft an unfair
agreement, it will likely be enforced (unless it is found unconscionable)
since courts will examine cohabitation agreements not under a “fair and
157. Id. at 145.
158. Id. at 146.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 147–48.
161. Id. at 146.
162. Andrea D. Heinbach & Pierce J. Reed, Wilcox v. Trautz: The Recognition of Relationship
Contracts in Massachusetts, 43 BOS. B.J. 6, 20 (1999).
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reasonable” standard, but rather, under a pure contract paradigm. 163 Another obvious problem with this approach is that many couples will fail to
enter into such a contract, either because they are not aware of cohabitation
agreements, or because they feel such an agreement is unnecessary. In
these jurisdictions, such couples will be left with little legal recourse since
the court in Wilcox explicitly rejected those portions of Marvin and other
cases which grant property rights to a nonmarital partner in the absence of
an express contract. 164
D. The Legislature Should Enact a Statute Making Express Agreements and Certain Implied Agreements Between Unmarried Cohabitants
Enforceable
As evidenced by these jurisdictions’ various approaches, the Illinois
legislature will have many options available to it in deciding which relationships—and which rights associated with them—will be recognized.
However, given the Illinois Supreme Court’s desire that the courts avoid
litigation of disputes between unmarried cohabitants, along with the need to
provide unmarried cohabitants with greater certainty and fairness, the best
option is to enforce express agreements (where the consideration is not
primarily sex) and implied agreements, but only where the party seeking
relief meets specific statutory requirements.
III. AN ILLINOIS COHABITATION STATUTE
As discussed in Part I above, there is a problem in Illinois right now
when it comes to cohabitation agreements. A forty-year old precedent is
being followed, but its underlying goal of keeping property claims brought
by unmarried cohabitants out of court is not being accomplished. Moreover, the public policy on which it relies—favoring marriage over private
arrangements—is being served by withholding basic common-law rights
from nonmarital couples, despite the unfair consequences that result from
that approach. Unfortunately, given the chance to reconsider and modernize
a decades-old approach, the Illinois Supreme Court has remained dedicated
to the position that this “delicate area of marriage-like relationships, which
163. Id. at 19.
164. Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 145 n.3. However, more recently, the Massachusetts Appellate Court,
after acknowledging that other states have permitted equitable claims that are not predicated on sexual
relations or the cohabiting relationship itself, has allowed unmarried cohabitants to bring claims based
on a recognized equitable remedy. See Sutton v. Valois, 846 N.E.2d 1171, 1175–76 (Mass. 2006)
(citing Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1267–69 (Colo. 2000); Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241,
245 (Ill. 1983)).
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involves evaluation of sociological data and alternatives . . . [is] best suited
to the superior investigative and fact-finding facilities of the legislative
branch in the exercise of its traditional authority to declare public policy in
the domestic relations field.” 165 Thus, in the absence of judicial action, the
legislature must answer the call of the Illinois Supreme Court and update
Illinois public policy to reflect our changing society, and, at the very least,
grant unmarried cohabitants the same rights as those not in a cohabitating,
sexual relationship.
Given the options available for enforcement of cohabitation agreements, and considering the underlying goal of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Hewitt, the best approach for Illinois is to enforce express, and certain implied, cohabitation agreements between unmarried cohabitants, but refuse
to hear equitable claims.
A. Enforce Express Agreements
First, the legislature should enact a statute codifying what courts in jurisdictions that recognize only express agreements 166 have held, i.e., a written contract concerning property and financial matters between unmarried
cohabitants, even if made in contemplation of cohabitation, is enforceable
except to the extent that sexual services constitute the dominant consideration for the agreement. 167 The legislature should indicate that the contract is
only enforceable upon termination of the relationship, 168 and will become
invalid if the parties eventually marry. 169 Finally, the statute should indicate
that such contract will not be enforced to the extent that it fails to conform
with Illinois law or public policy.
Enabling unmarried cohabitants to contract with each other will give
them greater certainty with respect to their property and financial rights.
Furthermore, it would put an end to the unfortunate situation in Illinois in
which unmarried cohabitants have lesser rights to contract than single individuals. Allowing cohabitants to enter into contract will also reduce litigation, since parties are less likely to seek judicial intervention when they
have established contractual rights to rely on.

165. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 58, 69 N.E.3d 834, 851 (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt,
394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1979)). However, as indicated in Part II, the economic rights of cohabitants
in nearly all states, with Minnesota and Texas being the only exceptions, have come about through
judicial opinions rather than legislative enactments.
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998).
168. MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2008).
169. Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 146 n.4.

590

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 93:2

B. Allow Certain Implied Contract Claims
Since not every cohabitating couple will have the means or the foresight to enter into a cohabitation agreement, the Illinois legislature should
also create statutory guidelines that indicate what relationships are worthy
of recognition in the absence of a written agreement. As evidenced by the
newly-enacted maintenance statute 170, the Illinois legislature is capable of
setting threshold requirements and detailing what exactly courts should
consider when litigating an issue. 171 Thus, in writing a statute that sets a
requirement for cohabitating couples seeking to enforce property and financial rights, the legislature can set a threshold requirement that will ensure that only meritorious claims are heard.
For example, the legislature might require that the cohabitating relationship last at least five years before a party can assert rights arising from
an implied agreement. Or, the legislature could follow Oregon’s intentbased approach, and require that the courts consider evidence which tends
to show the parties’ implied intent to enter a cohabitation agreement, including shared incomes and joint financial acts—such as joint checking
accounts, savings accounts or purchases. The legislature might also simply
state that litigants need only prove an indication that the couple was substantially committed to each other and leave it to the courts to determine,
based on the facts of the case, whether or not relief is appropriate. However, the clearer the guidelines the legislature provides, the less litigation will
result.
Whatever requirements the legislature deems appropriate, having an
option for unmarried cohabitants to assert rights based on implied contract
will ensure that meritorious claims are not turned away simply because the
couple did not enter a written agreement. Furthermore, such a statute would
serve as an incentive for litigants to settle out of court, knowing that they
either can or cannot establish the necessary elements to bring an implied
contract claim.
C. Refuse Equitable Claims
The legislature should also announce a policy stating that unmarried
cohabitants are not permitted to bring claims based on equitable rights. It
has long been recognized that equitable adjudication is a potentially dan-

170. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2017).
171. Under Illinois’s maintenance statute, the court must first consider fourteen relevant factors
and decide whether or not a maintenance award is appropriate. Id. 5/504(a)–(b).
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gerous source of arbitrary discretion by courts. 172 As has been shown in
cases following Hewitt, the standards the courts apply in deciding equitable
claims related to cohabitating relationships vary substantially depending on
what is asserted in a complaint or what relief is sought. Additionally, such
claims often require the court to delve into the couple’s relationship and it
is often difficult for litigants to prove equitable rights arising independently
from the cohabitating relationship, which can drain judicial time and resources. Recognizing equitable rights of cohabitants undermines the underlying policy goal of the Illinois Supreme Court, expressed in Hewitt: to
avoid substantial litigation that involves details of a couple’s living arrangement.
As such, the legislature should make a clear indication that any claim
brought by unmarried cohabitants seeking property or financial rights must
either be in writing, or conform to the statutory requirements allowing implied claims.
CONCLUSION
This suggested approach will give courts and litigants something concrete to rely on when planning and evaluating cohabitation agreements.
Furthermore, it will ensure that compelling claims—which, as shown in
Part I.B above, manifest themselves either way—are not only allowed, but
are grounded in law. Such a statute will save litigants, lawyers, and courts
time and resources because only meritorious claims will be heard, and
courts will be able to avoid hearing equitable claims related to marriagetype rights. Finally, this approach will allow the legislature to determine
what types of relationship we want to recognize in order to ensure meritorious claims are treated fairly, while keeping in line with Illinois public
policy favoring marriage.

172. GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE
RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1982) (“Throughout the entire history of procedural innovations in
equitable adjudication it was understood that equity is a potentially dangerous source of arbitrary discretion.”).

